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During 2006, substantial increases were recorded in residential and business robberies in Gauteng. Along
with hijackings, these three subcategories of aggravated robbery were collectively referred to as the 'Trio
Crimes'. After various policing operations failed to adequately reduce the Trio Crimes in Gauteng, the
Gauteng Department of Community Safety undertook research into international best practice for
combating residential and business robberies. The findings of this research formed the basis for the
Gauteng Aggravated Robbery Strategy, which was subsequently developed and implemented in
partnership with the Gauteng South African Police Service (SAPS). This initiative provides a case study
of the role that provincial governments could play in supporting the police to reduce crime in South
Africa.
The Constitution states that Provincial Executives
are entitled to 'determine provincial policing
needs and priorities' and to essentially monitor
police performance.1 The Gauteng Provincial
Government has taken this mandate seriously and
spells out its approach to achieving this objective
in the Gauteng Safety Strategy 2006-2014. During
2007, the Gauteng Department of Community
Safety developed and implemented the Gauteng
Information on Police Performance System
(GIPPS).2 This system enabled the department to
regularly monitor SAPS information on crime and
policing across the 134 police stations in the
province. As a result the department was quickly
able to identify the substantial increases in the
Trio Crimes during the first half of 2006 and
carefully evaluate the impact of the police’s
response to these crimes. Subsequently, the
department could play a proactive role in working
with the police to tackle aggravated robberies
through the development of the Gauteng
Aggravated Robbery Strategy. 
INITIAL INTERVENTIONS TO
TACKLE ROBBERY
Although police statistics show an overall decrease
in Gauteng crime levels since the 2003/2004
financial year, specific types of aggravated robbery
have unfortunately followed the opposite trend.3
Between 2005/06 and 2006/07, residential robbery
increased by 25 per cent and business robbery
increased by 43 per cent. Hijacking, which had
decreased by 27 per cent during the previous
three years, started to record an increase.
Collectively termed the Trio Crimes, these three
categories of robbery were given priority status by
the government because of the extent to which
they contribute to public fear and anxiety about
crime.  
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Indeed, the 2007 National Victims of Crime
Survey found that more people had become
victims of robbery than ever before. Moreover,
people who indicated that they were most fearful
of being robbed or having someone break into
their homes outnumbered those who stated that
they feared other crimes, including murder and
sexual assault.4
The nature of the Trio Crimes are of particular
concern to people, as they occur in places where
one would expect to feel the safest, such as at
home, at work, or while travelling in a motor
vehicle. These crimes can happen to anyone and
are highly traumatic to victims, as they are too
often accompanied by murder, rape and serious
assault, or the threat of these crimes. Although
they occur throughout South Africa, they are of a
particular concern in Gauteng, where 51 per cent
of the country's total number of residential
robberies, 52 per cent of its business robberies and
53 per cent of its hijackings occur.
During the first half of 2006 the Gauteng MEC for
Community Safety noted the substantial increases
in these robbery categories and requested that the
provincial SAPS develop a strategy to stabilise the
situation within six months. Consequently, the
Gauteng SAPS devised and implemented
Operation Iron Fist between July and December
2006. The impact of this operation was carefully
evaluated by the Department of Community
Safety, and the findings publicly presented by the
MEC.5 Although Operation Iron Fist yielded a
number of positive results, it failed to stabilise or
reduce the Trio Crimes.  
Early in the following year, the SAPS at national
level launched 'Operation Trio' in an effort to
reduce these specific crimes, as they had started to
increase across the country and not only in
Gauteng. However, by 2008 the SAPS conceded
that these crimes remained a significant challenge,
'despite various focused initiatives to counter them
in 2006 and 2007.'6 During the 2007/2008 financial
year, Gauteng was recording an average of 21
hijackings, 20 residential robberies and 14
business robberies every single day.  
DEVELOPING A NEW APPROACH 
The policing operations to tackle Trio robberies in
2006 and 2007 relied heavily on deploying
additional personnel into identified Trio crime
'hot-spots' to engage in high visibility activities
such as road-blocks, stop and searches and
increased patrols. While these tactics could reduce
Trio crimes in specific locations for a limited time,
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Figure 1: Gauteng Trio Crime Trends between 2002/03 and 2007/08
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it was clear that they were not leading to
sustainable reductions. Consequently, the Gauteng
Department of Community Safety undertook a
project to better understand the nature of the Trio
robberies and to identify other policing methods
that would have a better effect.  
After engaging with police officials and researchers
with knowledge of the Trio robberies, it was found
that the perpetrators were relatively organised and
planned their attacks well. They were used to
committing crime and had typically graduated to
committing residential and business robberies
after having spent some time committing petty
crime. The main purpose behind targeting
residences, businesses and vehicles was that a
single attack would generally yield higher value in
stolen goods and cash. When a perpetrator attacks
a person walking in the street, he may only
manage to steal a small amount of cash, jewellery
and a single cell phone. However, if a perpetrator
gets together with two or three others and they
attack people while they are at home or at their
business premises, they can substantially increase
the amount and value of stolen goods. Through
the use or threat of torture they can identify hiding
places or combinations of safes where items of
considerable value are kept.  
In addition to the economic incentive to commit
these types of robberies, it was found that there
was very little disincentive, as few perpetrators
were being arrested and successfully prosecuted.7
This was attributed to the time spent planning
their attack so that they would be able to surprise
and overpower their victims, and avoid police
operations in order to make a successful escape. As
these perpetrators operate across police precinct
boundaries and because they are strangers to their
victims, investigating officers who are precinct
bound will struggle to identify them without
additional assistance. But even when perpetrators
were arrested, a substantial proportion of the cases
were withdrawn in court due to a lack of evidence
resulting from inadequate crime scene
management and investigation. The combination
of these factors meant that criminally orientated
individuals and groups were increasingly
recognising that robbery was a low risk and high
yield enterprise.  
The department's research included exploring
international examples where robbery had been
effectively reduced, to establish to what extent
policing could have an impact on these crime
types. A number of examples were found of
different contexts in which robbery had been
reduced by the police. The two examples that are
briefly presented below demonstrate that even in
different circumstances, and where the police have
vastly different resource levels, there are common
tactics that will be successful in reducing robbery. 
A good example of robbery reduction within a
developing country with fewer resources than
South Africa was that of the city of Bogota in
Colombia, South America. While this city is better
known internationally for substantially reducing its
murder rate through a combination of law
enforcement and social crime prevention
initiatives, Bogota's robbery rate also decreased by
75 per cent between 1996 and 2001.8 Interestingly
enough, this was achieved without increasing the
number of police officials, and during a period
when unemployment was on the rise. Through
focused investments and improvements in police
training, crime intelligence and investigation, the
Bogota police were able to increase their arrest and
detention rates of wanted suspects by over 
500 per cent.9 While a range of other interventions
were conducted in Bogota over this period, a
detailed evaluation of what primarily caused the
reduction in violent crime found that '…the stick
measures explain this reduction in greater
proportion...'. This supported the use of proper
policing methods as an effective means of reducing
violent crime.10
Another well-known example is that of New York
City between 1990 and 1999, where various violent
crimes decreased substantially, including robbery,
which decreased by 67 per cent.  While many
theories have been forwarded to explain the
decrease in New York's crime rate, there is
emerging consensus that an improvement in
policing was one of the key factors behind the
decline. Earlier analysis found that during this
period, '[w]hen the arrest rate of robbers rose 10
percent, the number of robberies fell 5.7 to 5.9%.'11
A later and more thorough analysis of all the
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factors at play at the time of the crime reduction
found that a key factor that contributed to New
York experiencing a far greater and sustainable
reduction in overall violent crime levels when
compared to other American cities was '…both
the quantity of police in the city and the way
police were deployed, evaluated and managed.'12
Key to the success of the NYPD in reducing
robberies specifically was the improved
coordination of intelligence and criminal
investigations by specialised detective units tasked
with identifying and arresting the perpetrators.13
In addition to the above two examples, a number
of other robbery reduction strategies were
examined. It became clear that wherever successful
examples of robbery reduction were found, similar
policing approaches were adopted. Typically,
police managers were subjected to substantially
higher levels of accountability for identifying and
arresting the actual perpetrators of crime, and
ensuring that incontrovertible evidence is
presented before a court of law so that appropriate
prison sentences are handed down. This serves to
reduce the number of people who commit
robberies, while increasing the risk and thereby
the disincentives to other criminally inclined
individuals from becoming involved in this type of
crime. As violent crime decreases, communities
feel less afraid, increase their trust in the police,
and are better able to control petty crimes such as
theft and drug dealing in their neighbourhoods. 
THE GAUTENG AGGRAVATED
ROBBERY STRATEGY
The Gauteng Department of Community Safety
was very aware that policing strategies that work
in other countries might not always be effective in
South Africa. For this reason the strategy was
developed in close consultation with experienced
SAPS police officials working in different
components of the organisation. This ensured that
the SAPS in the province could implement the
final strategy. It was determined that the SAPS had
already successfully employed similar tactics in
Johannesburg to substantially reduce hijackings in
the early years of this decade. However, the
capacity that was in place at that time had been
focused on specific locations and had subsequently
been disbanded and redeployed once hijackings
had decreased. 
Given the scale of the challenge in Gauteng, it was
clear that the biggest challenge facing the police
was the strengthening and coordination of
intelligence and investigations across the province.
In addition, attention would have to be given to
improving cooperation with other important role
players such as the National Prosecuting Authority
and other law enforcement agencies. It was not
enough to simply identify and arrest the
perpetrators; they had to be removed from society
through incarceration if robbery were to decrease. 
A summary of the key elements and the
implementation of the strategy to date are as
follows: 
Strengthening crime intelligence and analysis of
Trio Crimes 
The Crime Intelligence component has started to
give greater attention to identifying and locating
perpetrators of Trio crimes and the networks
involved in supporting them. This is partly
achieved through the interrogation of arrested
suspects by crime intelligence agents. 
The establishment of 22 specialised Trio Crime
investigating units 
All of the 134 police stations in the province have
been grouped together into 22 clusters, each with a
cluster commander. Each of these clusters has a
dedicated unit consisting of skilled and
experienced detectives. This has allowed detectives
to pool their resources, work across police precinct
boundaries, and focus their energies on Trio cases.
Each Trio task team is also responsible for tracing
and arresting identified wanted suspects who live
in their areas. 
Enhancing forensic support to Trio Crime
investigators  
Some form of forensic evidence is left by
perpetrators at each crime scene, be it fingerprints,
shoe prints or DNA. This type of evidence is the
most effective way to link a perpetrator to a crime
scene in a court of law for the purposes of securing
a conviction. Following the adoption of the
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strategy the Local Criminal Record Centre
(LCRC) forensic investigators have prioritised
attending every Trio crime scene to gather
possible forensic evidence.14
Improve response times to 10111 emergency calls 
The quicker the police are able to respond to calls
for assistance when robberies are reported, the
more likely they are to arrest perpetrators. During
2008 the 10111 Centre launched 'Project Reaction
Time', which improved the Gauteng SAPS
monthly average response time for serious crimes
by 48 per cent between May 2008 and May 2009. 
Disrupt perpetrators though intelligence-led
roadblocks and saturated policing  
Using an analysis of crime patterns and trends,
visible policing components can increase the
chance of apprehending perpetrators though
roadblocks and 'search and seizure' operations
targeted at specific localities at particular times. A
special roadblock task team has been established
at each of the 22 clusters across Gauteng for this
purpose. 
The establishment of the Gauteng Crime
Management Centre (CMC)
This is a new structure specifically established to
provide coordination amongst all the above
functions. It is staffed with officers from crime
intelligence, detectives, LCRC and visible
policing, with the aim of coordinating the strategy
against Trio crimes across the province. Each Trio
robbery reported anywhere in the province is also
expected to be reported to the CMC within 30
minutes. In addition, any arrests, profiles of
suspects, or evidence collected need to be
reported to the structure. By obtaining and
analysing data across the province, the CMC is
improving the capacity of the SAPS to identify
and profile groups of perpetrators and support
networks, and link them to specific crime scenes.
In addition, where necessary, specialised
operational and technical investigative support is
provided at various crime scenes when required.
Improving Trio case management through the
criminal justice system 
The strategy called for dedicated prosecutors to
work with the Trio task teams to ensure that bail
could be successfully opposed and that, in order
to minimise postponements, cases were trial
ready before being placed on the court roll.
During 2008 the Deputy Minister of Justice
adopted the strategy as a pilot project for the
Criminal Justice Review process so as to identify
ways in which case flows could be improved. To
date, specific experienced prosecutors have been
identified to work closely with each of the Trio
task teams. 
In addition to the above components of the
strategy, the Gauteng Department of
Community Safety has provided support in the
following ways:
• Buying and allocating 42 high-speed vehicles 
to the SAPS Provincial Rapid Response Unit,
which is tasked with responding to robbery
incidents
• Establishing a specialised Anti-Truck 
Hijacking unit within the Traffic Law
Enforcement component to respond to
hijackings on provincial roads
• Coordinating joint roadblocks between the 
SAPS and the Gauteng Traffic Law
Enforcement Agency 
• Providing counselling and support to victims 
of Trio crimes through the Ikhaya Lethemba
Victim Empowerment Centre and police
station-based victim empowerment centres
• Building a community patroller programme 
that has resulted in over 8 000 carefully
screened, trained and equipped community
volunteers partaking in police deployed
patrol groups in 71 policing precincts 
CONCLUSION
The implementation of the strategy is tracked
through a monthly Joint Steering Committee
meeting; co-chaired by the SAPS Provincial
Commissioner, Perumal Naidoo, and the Head
of the Department of Community Safety,
Margaret-Ann Diedricks. At this meeting the
various police commanders and departmental
managers responsible for implementing various
components of the strategy report on what has
been achieved in the previous month.
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Departmental officials also attend each one of the
22 monthly cluster meetings held by the SAPS
Cluster Commanders to monitor the
implementation of the strategy throughout the
province. Furthermore, each month a detailed
evaluation of five high-crime police stations is
undertaken to establish how they are performing
against priority violent crimes, including murder,
rape and aggravated robbery. 
There was no illusion that it would take some
time to fully implement the strategy, given that at
the time when it was formally adopted in June
2008, none of the required structures such as the
CMC, the Trio Task Teams and the Rapid
Response Units were in place. It has only been
since February 2009 that most of the structures
have been up and running, and it is therefore too
early to evaluate the impact of the strategy on
Trio crimes at a provincial level. 
Nevertheless, where the core elements of the
strategy have been implemented, there have been
some signs of improvement. For example, in one
of the policing precincts that has consistently
recorded amongst the highest levels and increases
in Trio crime and was one of the first to
implement some of the core elements of the
strategy (e.g. establishing a specialised detective
unit), recorded double digit decreases in
residential robbery and hijacking during the
2008/2009 financial year. In addition, business
robberies started to decrease in that precinct
during the last quarter of the current financial
year (January to March 2009). 
In Gauteng as a whole there were early signs that
the strategy could be starting to bear fruit, with
residential robberies and hijacking showing
decreases during April and May 2009 (the latest
figures available at the time of writing). While
insufficient time has passed to evaluate the
strategy, it will continue to be monitored and,
where necessary, adjustments made, until the
scourge of aggravated robberies cease to be a
major threat to the people of Gauteng.
To comment on this article visit
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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